Session Chairs:

Regis Deloche, Universite de Franche-Comte

Papers:

"Revelation in Dynastic Repeated Games With Dynamic Inconsistency and Private Information"
Zaki Zahran, Georgetown University (Contact Author)

"On Dynamic Compromise"
T. Renee Bowen, Georgetown University (Contact Author)

"Communication Via Cheap Talk in Coordination Games: Moliere's The Learned Ladies and Tartuffe as Experimental Tests of Aumann's Conjecture"
Regis Deloche, Universite de Franche-Comte (Contact Author)

"Direct Tests of Models of Social Preferences and a New Model"
James C. Cox, University of Arizona and Georgia State University (Contact Author)
Vjolica Sadiraj, University of Arizona

Discussants:

Jeffrey A. Livingston, Bentley College
Kalidas Jana, Trinity University